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Abstract 
The Fraud Act 2006 provides us with an instrument through which we can now target 
emerging online criminal threats posed by identity thieves. This paper argues for a 
nuanced approach to the debates regarding the amenability of online criminal activity 
to centralised regulatory oversight.  Managing risks in a decentralised and 
distributed network environment has frequently descended into a question of how 
liability rules can be harnessed to promote trust and security. We argue that a deeper 
understanding of the governance implications of managing complex systems is an 
important prerequisite to coherent policymaking. The analysis advocated in the paper 
has a number of implications for the way we understand and conceptualise 
information security governance in the online environment. We identify three. First, 
law is a necessary but not a sufficient governance instrument in managing the 
emerging threats on the Internet. Second, identity theft is a social not technologically 
driven problem. Third, emerging networks for information sharing, the evolution of 
specialised technological solutions and increased end-user participation suggest an 
important trend in the way online threats can be conceptualised and managed. The 
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central thesis of the paper is that Luhmann’s ideas of autopoiesis and social systems 
may provide us with a better understanding of governance in the online environment 
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Identity theft, phishing and pharming have suddenly raised issues in respect of law’s 
inability to deter perpetrators of such criminal activities. There is some justification 
for the growing concerns. The “Internet Security Threat Report” issued on September 
17, 2007 describes the increased use of the Internet and its resources to facilitate 
identity theft, and the acquisition of personal and sensitive information to undertake 
online criminal activity. The Anti-Phishing Working Group, noted that 23917 unique 
phishing reports were received in July 2007.1 The number of unique phishing sites 
created for this month was estimated at 30999. According to Symantec, criminals 
have at their disposal new and sophisticated technologies.2 Criminals are now using 
websites as malware vectors. Computers of visitors to legitimate web sites can now be 
infected by ‘drive-by’ malware. Identity fraud is a growing problem. According to 
APACS, the UK payments association, identity theft imposes significant economic 
burdens.3 Costs have been estimated to be around £504.8m. These are losses resulting 
from plastic cards used by persons appropriating the identity of a rightful owner or 
fictitious identity.4 The Home Office Identity Fraud Steering Committee reports that 
identity fraud costs the UK economy £1.7 billion.5 Can the law, and in particular, the 
criminal law, be used to steer through social norms which will sustain trust and 
confidence in the online environment? This is an important question – the Fraud Act 
2006 is seen as undertaking a strategic regulatory role. However, it is submitted that 
the maintenance of trust and confidence in the online environment is not purely a 
public law matter. The borderless nature of online activities highlights the private 
dimension of information security governance. Is law therefore an apposite 
mechanism through which social policies regarding responsible computer use and 
prudent risk management and assessment be achieved? This paper argues for a 
nuanced approach to the debates regarding the amenability of online criminal activity 
to centralised regulatory oversight.  Managing risks in a decentralised and distributed 
network environment has frequently descended into a question of how liability rules 
can be harnessed to promote trust and security. We argue however that a deeper 
understanding of the governance implications of managing complex systems is an 
important prerequisite to informed and coherent policymaking. This paper will not re-
visit issues relating to the economics of cybersecurity or whether Internet Service 
Providers and software manufacturers should assume greater responsibility for the 
losses resulting from identity theft. These are of course important questions. That 
said, we submit that an understanding of the threat landscape in the context of 
complex social systems and its significance for the Fraud Act 2006 may provide us 
with a better grasp of the reality of governance in the Internet. Accordingly, the 
analysis advocated in the paper has a number of implications for the way we currently 
view the role of the Fraud Act 2006 in relation to identity theft. We identify three. 
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First, law is a necessary but not a sufficient governance instrument in managing 
emerging threats on the Internet. Second, identity theft is a social not technologically 
driven problem. Third, emerging networks for information sharing, the evolution of 
specialised technological solutions and increased end-user participation suggest an 
important trend in the way online threats can be conceptualised and managed. The 
central thesis of the paper is that Luhmann’s ideas of autopoiesis and social systems 
may provide us with a better understanding of governance in the online environment 
than what seems to be afforded by current analysis of the 2006 Act. 
2. Law and “Right Answers” 
It is uncontroversial that the criminal law is an important instrument of social policy.6 
The State’s monopoly over the coercive machinery of the criminal law corresponds 
very much with the importance individuals attach to order and security. The criminal 
law can also be viewed as a significant instrument for promoting compliance with 
accepted standards of behaviour and norms.7 It also has symbolic value. The rules and 
norms of behaviour commonly correspond with society’s normative expectations of 
what constitutes acceptable conduct. It is therefore not surprising that when criminal 
activities migrate into the online environment, we see various strands of the normative 
role of the criminal law weaving themselves into the debates on governance. The 
criminal law is now seen as having an important role in finding the ‘right answers’ to 
the evolving threats posed by identity thieves.  
‘Identity theft’ is defined by the Oxford English dictionary as comprising the 
dishonest acquisition of personal information in order to perpetrate fraud, typically by 
obtaining credit, loans, etc., in someone else’s name.8  Chawki and Wahab have 
rightly noted that the term identity is often used in an arbitrary and imprecise manner 
in popular media and literature.9 It is arguable that the appropriation of an identity of 
itself will not give rise to a criminal offence.10 These matters are not the concern of 
the paper in the light of the Fraud Act 2006. We can now illustrate how law views the 
activity of phishing.11 Phishing is an online activity that uses social engineering 
strategies and technical ploys to gain access to an individuals’ personal identity, data 
and other information.12 Phishing attacks harness the technology of the Internet and 
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software to create fraudulent emails. In the example below, a victim receives a 
phishing email purporting to come from a trusted party, Woodgrove Bank. This email 
has a link to a fraudulent website. The email and the creation of a fraudulent website 
are designed to trick the unsuspecting individual to think that Woodgrove Bank has 
been the initiator of the communication. Spoof emails and websites like this are 
frequently used by phishers to gain unauthorised access to a range of information, 







As these two examples show, the victim is led to trust the authenticity of the source 
since the fraudulent link appears to have the same URL as the trusted source. The link 




What is particularly significant about the Fraud Act 2006 is that the act of sending 
such emails will in itself give rise to prosecution. There is no requirement for the 
phisher to be shown to have used the information to access the funds in the victim’s 
account. The victim need not respond to the email or act on the request. The 2006 
Act, which was enacted to keep abreast of emerging technologies and to obviate the 
need for constant reactive reform, appears to facilitate the prosecution of phishing, 
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demanding neither proof of deception nor the obtaining of any property, which were 
pre-requisites to conviction under the previous legislation.14 Section 1 of the 2006 Act 
creates a new general offence of ‘fraud’, which can be committed in three ways: by 
false representation (s2); by failing to disclose information (s3); and by abuse of 
position (s4). Section 2, with which we are primarily concerned here, provides as 
follows: 
‘(1) A person is in breach of this section if he—  
(a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and  
(b) intends, by making the representation—  
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or  
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.’ 
  
Section 2 sub-sections (2) and (3) respectively, state that representation means any 
representation as to fact or law and that a representation may be expressed or implied. 
In other words, there is no limitation on the way a representation must be made and it 
will therefore include a representation being in written or spoken form, or where it is 
posted on a website or email. The 2006 Act will cover all forms of phishing activity. 
These include, sending of spoof emails to unsuspecting businesses and individuals 
(‘vishing’) and spear phishing. In spear phishing, the email looks very much like an 
authentic email one expects to receive from an employer, business or organisation.15 
In this phishing attack, the recipient may submit relevant information like passwords 
and login information as they assume that the request has come from a trusted person 
within that organisation or business.  Thus in the context of phishing activity, the 
actus reus of the section 2 offence is fulfilled when the initial email requesting the 
recipient to access a given website is received and read. The email constitutes an 
implied representation that it is from a legitimate source. With respect to mens rea 
requirements for section 2, the first element that must be proved by the prosecution is 
that the phisher made the representation dishonestly, which is not defined by the 2006 
Act, and which remains a question of fact for the jury.16 
The second element to be proved is that the phisher must know that his representation 
is or might be untrue or misleading (s2(2)(b)). Third, the phisher must intend, by the 
false representation to make a gain for himself or another, or to cause loss to another 
or to expose another to a risk of loss. Section 5 provides that both these elements 
extend only to gain or loss in money or other property;  and include any such gain or 
loss whether temporary or permanent.  Property here is understood to cover any 
property whether real or personal (including things in action and other intangible 
property). “Gain” includes a gain by keeping what one has, as well as a gain by 
getting what one does not have. “Loss” includes a loss by not getting what one might 
get, as well as a loss by parting with what one has. The broad definition in section 2 is 
also technologically neutral. This is particularly significant since law can now 
accommodate new forms of subterfuge.  
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 Sections 15 and 15A Theft Act 1968. 
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Although the criminal law continues to fulfil an important role in coordinating the 
way individuals organize their behaviour, its ability to deter identity theft and more 
generally cybercrimes has come under increased scrutiny.17 Some have questioned 
whether the orthodox assumptions made about the regulatory capabilities of the 
criminal law necessarily bear true in the online environment.18 Others have located 
the sub-optimal capabilities of the criminal law on a range of variables - resources, 
perceptions about the low detection and prosecution rates, the relatively low costs and 
ease with which cybercrimes can be perpetrated, and the gains to be made by using 
low cost high return strategies.19 For example there is increasing evidence that many 
of the vulnerability exploits are the result of an active grey market in phishing and 
cybercrime toolkits.20 The Sumitomo Bank in London was the subject of such an 
attack. Thieves installed a keylogger into the bank’s computer. A keylogger can be 
purchased at the cost of £35. This device can be used to record the strokes made on a 
computer keyboard.21 A phisher can obtain up to 2 million keystrokes from a 
keylogger. In the case involving Sumitomo Bank, the thieves were attempting to 
transfer £220 million out of the bank’s account.22 Another example of the ease with 
which cybercrimes can be committed is in the recent successful attempt by a group of 
online thieves in assuming the identity of ten account holders and transferring large 
sums of money out of the banks.23 These incidents not only illustrate the ease with 
which security can be compromised but they remind us that the management of risk is 
not purely a public goods problem. More importantly, the ability of the criminal law 
as an instrument for steering through social policies must now contend with the scale 
of the governance challenges that the online environment now poses. Organisational 
information security oversight and poor safe computing practices by individuals 
contribute to the rise of identity theft. Law, it is submitted, is a necessary but not 
sufficient mechanism through which identity theft can be tackled. One way through 
which we can expand the narrative of governance is with this query: assume that 
absolute online security is not possible and that you are charged with the 
responsibility of devising solutions to promote trust and security. What would be your 
commencing point? Wall’s commencing point is that we can encode legal norms and 
values – code is law.24 He does not dwell on this since he acknowledges that 
measuring the effectiveness of legal regulation poses insuperable difficulties.25 
                                               
17
 L B Benson, K Iljoong and D W Rasmussen, “Estimating Deterrence Effects: A Public Choice 
Perspective on the Economics of Crime Literature”, (1994) 61 Southern Economic Journal.   
18
 S Cameron, “The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence”, (1988) 41 (2) 
Kyklos, 301-323. 
19
 N Kshetri, “The Simple Economics of Cybercrimes”, IEEE Security & Privacy, January/February 
2006, 33-39. 
20
 CBS News, “Hackers getting more professional”, September 17, 2007 Available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/09/17/tech/main3267347.shtml?source=search_story.  
21
 http://www.kmint21.com/keylogger/.  
22
 See J Leyden “Cyber cops foil £220 million Sumitomo bank raid”, 17 March 2005    
http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2005/03/17/sumitomo_cyber-heist_foiled/. 
23
 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2759818.ece.  
24
 D Wall, Cybercrimes: The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age (Polity Press, 2007) 187-
189. 
25
 Ibid. 188. 
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Software can be used as part of the standard setting and regulatory agenda. The issue 
of benchmarking is important – but it is not a problem that is unique to online crimes. 
Additionally, design solutions in the form of anti-identity theft software, can be 
counterproductive if we ignore “human” systems. Too often breaches in security can 
be linked to end users becoming complacent or careless with passwords and 
usernames. Others have focused, for example, on the way legal liability rules, could 
be harnessed to distribute existing burdens borne by society generally, the available 
options for imbuing social norms and standards into software and the strategies for 
securing compliance.26 Consistent with this line of policy deliberation is Anderson’s 
call for a re-assessment of the existing liability rules and that software vendors should 
now be made to shoulder greater responsibility.27 Legal rules can be used to influence 
the way individuals approach risks.28 This point is underscored by the recognition that 
many software manufacturers and businesses do not attach sufficient importance to 
information security:29 
“We see ‘take-down’ as a reactive strategy, an increasingly 
prevalent trend in the way that security issues are being handled. 
Software vendors wait for vulnerabilities to be discovered and then 
issue patches. Anti-virus tools update their databases with new 
signatures as new viruses are identified. In these reactive 
approaches, the defenders aim to identify the bad guys as quickly as 
possible to minimise exposure, while the bad guys scramble to open 
new holes at a sufficiently fast rate to continue their activities.” 
There is however a more problematic aspect to information security governance – this 
is to do with the problem of managing complex social systems. Many have observed 
that the Internet is a complex network of networks.30 Murray, for example, has no 
doubts that in the Internet:31 
“…the process of regulation is...complex. All parties in a regulatory 
environment continually and simultaneously act as regulator and 
regulatee. Changes within the regulatory environment are therefore 
constant and as a result the first stage in designing a regulatory 
                                               
26
 See generally Select Committee on Science and Technology, 5th Report on Personal Internet 
Security (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2007) (hereinafter 5th Report on Personal Internet 
Security). 
27
 R Anderson, “Why information security is hard: An economic perspective”, (2001).  Presented at the 
18th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, October 21-24, Lake Louise, Alberta, Canada; also 
the 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, December 10-14, New Orleans, 
Louisiana; http://www.ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/econ.pdf.  
28
 L Gordon and M Loeb, “The economics of information security investment”, ACM Transactions on 
Information and System Security (2002) 5 (4), 438-457, S Skaperdas, “Conflict and attitudes toward 
risk”, (1991) 81 American Economic Review, 116-120. 
29
 T Moore and R Clayton, “An Empirical Analysis of the Current State of Phishing Attack and 
Defence”, http://weis2007.econinfosec.org/papers/51.pdf. Workshop on the Economics of Information 
Security, 2007.  
30
 A Murray, The Regulation of Cyberspace (UK: GlassHouse, 2007) 250-251. 
31
 Ibid. 250. 
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intervention in any complex regulatory environment, including 
cyberspace, is to develop a dynamic model of the environment, 
recording all parties and mapping their contemporary regulatory 
settlements with each other. Second, by observing this environment, 
regulators are required to map the communications dynamic in 
place within this regulatory matrix…all that is required is that the 
dynamic of such communication is mapped. In other words, the 
regulator need not anticipate the needs of all actors in the 
regulatory matrix; they need only anticipate the regulatory tensions 
that are likely to arise when actors communicate. Finally, once a 
regulatory intervention has been designed, it should be tested 
thoroughly.” 
What does that entail in policy and strategic terms in the specific context of identity 
theft and phishing? In setting out an organic regulatory framework, Murray is drawing 
on some of the insights generated by systems theorists, in particular Niklas Luhmann. 
There is much to commend his analysis. In attempting to emphasise the complexity of 
the governance process however, Murray fails to highlight one of the fundamental 
insights offered by Niklas Luhmann – sub-systems such as markets, law and politics 
have structures and processes that are self-referential and preserve their own 
distinctiveness.32 This is a critical insight for two reasons. First, juridicalisation is 
only one means through which complex social problems and risks are defined.33 
Second, if we accept that society is a complex system, it is imperative that we have a 
plausible explanation as to why its order is possible in an environment of autonomous 
self-preserving social systems. 
Before we can begin the task of unpacking the insights of Luhmann, we need to 
approach the problems posed by identity theft differently. Let us for example begin by 
reformulating the central tenets of Murray’s propositions in the following manner: 
what makes private ordering in the online environment complex? Two features of the 
online environment, it is suggested, challenge the orthodox approach in attempting to 
coerce individuals to internalize acceptable norms of behaviour: first, the technical 
infrastructure enables asynchronous interactions in decentralised and distributed 
networks; and second, the presumptive norm of access contributes to the ease with 
which identity thieves and phishers mobilise resources of the Internet to externalise 
onto society the costs of any actions.34 As Walden noted in his testimony before the 
Select Committee on Personal Internet Security:35 
“It is all data. It is all zeros and ones, which go across the network, 
whether it is a virus, a child abuse image or a political statement. 
Our ability to distinguish at a network level the stream of data 
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 Ibid. 244-248. 
33
 M King, “What’s the Use of Luhmann’s Theory?” in M King and C Thornhill (eds), Luhmann On 
Law and Politics  (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 46-47. See later discussion on the significance of autopoietic 
social systems for information security governance.  
34
 See generally the panel papers organised by the Yale Information Society Project, The Global Flow 
of Information (2004) available at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/isp/GlobalFlow/index.html. 
35
 5th Report on Personal Internet Security, supra, n 26 at Q390. 
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which is passing is difficult without perhaps capturing too much 
legitimate data or not capturing the illegitimate data.” 
It is of course true that we are dealing with data – notwithstanding the medium, we 
are still faced with a long-standing societal problem of deviants in society threatening 
value. Like Murray, the extract above does not assist us in any meaningful way other 
than to remind us that the end-to-end architecture embeds the norm of legitimacy in 
all communications. Instead of focussing on data or the organic regulatory model, let 
us remind ourselves of the scale of the threat landscape. CIFAS, the United 
Kingdom’s Fraud Prevention Service has remarked on the rise in cases of most types 
of financial fraud during the first half of 2007, when compared with the same period 
in 2006.36 During the first six months of 2006, Symantec reported an 86 per cent 
increase in phishing messages per day.37 The large numbers of phishing activities 
were directed at the financial services and banking sectors. For example, the banking 
industry estimated that phishing frauds cost the industry £22 million in the first half of 
2006.38 A British man was recently sentenced for four years for operating an eBay 
Internet auction scam. He accessed account details from users and assumed their 
online identities to perpetrate these scams.39 The Select Committee has commented on 
the ease with which criminals are now imposing negative externalities on society 
generally.40 These examples illustrate the scale and reach of the evolving threats 
posed by identity thieves. More importantly, for present purposes, rather than focus 
on ‘data’ or the constitutional aspects of content filtering, we could direct our efforts 
instead on how sub-systems in society view risk and assess their relevance for 
information security governance.  
Let us begin with a seemingly uncontroversial observation about the risk society. 
Society, according to Beck, responds to increased risks reflexively. For example, 
concerns about the threats posed by evolving risks from identity thieves, denial of 
services attacks, malware and viruses, result in risk being problematised by society. 
The characterization of particular risks as a ‘problem’ is treated as an important 
prerequisite to communications becoming part of the public discourse.41  The juridical 
model of risk management is one part of this reflexive landscape. Reflexive 
modernisation is a form of self-confrontation. Beck regards this process as a form of 
societal critique of itself. It involves:42 
                                               
36
 See http://www.cifas.org.uk/default.asp?edit_id=715-57.  
37
 http://www.symantec.com/specprog/threatreport/ent-
whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_x_09_2006.en-us.pdf. In the last half of 2005 
over 86,906 phishing messages were detected, whilst in the first half of 2006, the numbers increased to 
157,477. 
38
 See BBC News, “Which? highlights Phishing losses”, 28 February, 2007 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6401079.stm.  
39
 See BBC News, “Identity Theft Fraudster, guilty” 30 November, 2006 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/6196802.stm.  
40
 Supra, note 26. 
41
 U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992) 21. 
42
 U Beck, “Risk society and the provident state” in S Lash, B Szerszinski and B Wynne (eds), Risk, 
Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology (London: Sage, 1996) 27-43, 34. 
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“the combination of reflex and reflections which, as long as the 
catastrophe itself fails to materialise, can set industrial modernity 
on the path to self-criticism and self-transformation. Reflexive 
modernisation contains both elements: the reflex-like threat to 
industrial society’s own foundations through a successful further 
modernisation which is blind to dangers, and the growth of 
awareness, the reflection on this situation.” 
The reflexivity process is not entirely dissimilar from the governance model proposed 
by Murray. Beck’s understanding of the process of risk management involves a two-
step phase. First, the risks created by new technologies must be identified. Second, the 
“self-confrontation” phase occurs when individuals, policymakers and society 
undertake a debate about how the risks are to be managed. Reflexive modernisation, 
in short can be likened to a political, legal, and cultural form of creative destruction.43 
Beck’s reflexive thesis however, gives little weight to the way autonomous sub-
systems conceptualise risk or that social systems do not operate under a universal 
goal. 44 This is a conclusion that can be drawn when reflecting on Murray’s 
exposition. Murray’s regulatory model can however be viewed as taking us in the 
right direction, but only to the extent that it draws our attention to the limits of law as 
an instrument of standard setting and private ordering. The question, how do social 
systems such as law, markets, or politics, for example, make sense of risk needs an 
answer if we seek a coherent and balanced understanding of the emerging information 
security governance challenges. Highlighting the need for responsive and nuanced 
regulation is important. Drawing attention to the deficiencies of the law is a necessary 
part of this enterprise. In both instances however, the insights generated do not assist 
us in grasping the particular way sub-systems such as law function in the social 
system. As King and Thornhill observe:45 
“Any sociological examination of risks as a product of decision, 
therefore, should be conducted by observing the various ways in 
which these make sense of future uncertainty and attribute their 
control and management to decision-making. For Luhmannian 
sociology, the problematic of risk becomes, therefore, not simply 
how each functional subsystem is to deal effectively with risks, but 
how each system conceptualises risk in its own terms and is able (or 
unable) to contribute to a general societal belief that risks are 
indeed controllable, and avoidable through a process of causal 
attribution.” 
The question therefore is not how sub-systems such as law, economy, or politics deal 
or ought to deal with risks. According to Luhmann, the autopoietic processes of 
                                               
43
 U Beck, “The reinvention of politics: towards a theory of reflexive modernization”, in U Beck, A 
Giddens, and S Lash, Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social 
Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) 1-55, 2. 
44
 See GAO Report, “Information Security: Despite Reported Progress, Federal Agencies Need to 
Address Persistent Weaknesses”, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07837.pdf (accessed, 17 
August, 2007). 
45
 M King and C Thornhill, Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005) pp 183-184. 
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functionally differentiated sub-systems and their significance for the way events are 
reconstructed merit a priori analysis.  
3. Autopoiesis and Social Systems: Niklas Luhmann 
3.1 Niklas Luhmann and Law as a Social System  
Systems theory has been used by many disciplines to understand and analyse complex 
phenomena and situations.46 This theory departs from the anthropocentric emphasis 
that typifies the way we approach a wide range of legal topics. Systems’ thinking on 
the other hand requires us to view events, situations in society, and decision making 
structures in organisations and intra-organisations as being constituted by complex 
and interdependent processes.47 According to Luhmann, society can be understood in 
terms of autonomous spheres of sub-systems, which undertake different social 
functions.48 Luhmann’s view of sub-systems can be depicted in the following manner: 
 
 
As he observes:49 
 
“…systems make and continue to make a difference between the 
system and its environment. Every single operation that contributes 
to the self-reproduction of the system- that is, in the case of society, 
every single communication - reproduces this difference. In this 
sense, societies are operationally closed systems. They cannot 
                                               
46
 N Wiener, Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press,1961) (Orig Pub 1948) p162, H Maturana and F Varela, Autopoiesis and cognition (D 
Reidel: Dordrecht, Holland, 1972) pp xi-xvii. 
47
 L von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory. Foundations, Development, Applications (London: 
Allen Lane, 1968) and WR Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics (London: Chapman and Hall Ltd, 
1956). 
48
 J Priban and D Nelken, “Introduction” in J Priban and D Nelken (eds) Law’s New Boundaries 
(England: Ashgate Dartmouth, 2001) 1. 
49
 N Luhmann, “Why Does Society Describe itself as Postmodern” in W Rasch (ed), Observing 
Complexity: Systems Theory and Postmodernity (US: Univ of Minnesota Press, 2000) 36. 
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operate outside their own boundaries. Nevertheless, the system can 
use its own operations to distinguish itself from its environment. It 
can communicate about itself (about communication) and/ or about 
its environment. It can distinguish between self-reference and 
hetero-reference, but this has to be done by an internal operation.” 
Luhmann’s preference for using social systems as an explanatory framework in 
understanding phenomena can be gleaned from his observation that modern society 
has evolved from segmented and stratified hierarchies to spheres of functionally 
differentiated social systems.50 This paradigm shift requires us to reassess the way we 
conceptualise society and its regulatory institutions. According to Luhmann, networks 
of communications constitute society.51 All communications take place in society.52 
The basic components of communication include interactions and communications 
within society.  The elementary units of meaningful communications are constituted 
by the synthesis of information, communication and comprehension. 53 As Mingers 
notes:54 
“information is what the message is about, utterance is the form in 
which it is produced together with the intentions of its sender, and 
understanding is the meaning that it generates (which can include 
misunderstanding) in the receiver.” 
Luhmann’s constructivist epistemology in respect of the way meaning in 
communications is reconstructed deploys a second order observation of society (i.e. 
communications involve observations about communications).55 Communications, 
and not individuals become the objects of observation. Luhmann is particularly 
interested in understanding how sub-systems such as politics, markets and law 
reconstruct discrete meanings from one single event. For example, a phishing attack 
would be viewed by law as an ‘illegal act’. A purchase of an anti-phishing kit by a 
consumer or an organisation would be viewed by the economy as a market 
transaction. Communications arising from identity theft will be reconstructed by sub-
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systems according to their structures and processes: law (for example, in the form of 
the legal and evidentiary rules under the Fraud Act 2006), economy (the collation of 
banks financial statistics), education (in the form of Internet Service providers and the 
Anti-Phishing Working Group’s assessment of the impact of these criminal activities 
on trust and confidence) and politics (reflecting public concerns and responding to the 
need for legislation).56 Luhmann’s emphasis on the meaning construction role of sub-
systems needs to be considered along with the inferences he draws from his 
proposition that society is also an autopoietic system.57 Society is autopoietic in the 
sense that it has structures and processes that enable it to produce and reproduce 
itself.58 Law, according to Luhmann is one example of an autopoietic sub-system.59 
Sub-systems may evolve and reflect the complex realities of the environment. For 
example, in highly integrated and technologically advanced societies sub-systems 
such as politics, law, economy and education mirror the complexities of the 
environment in its structures and processes. Agrarian or less advanced societies will 
have sub-systems that are less complex and structures that model the relative 
simplicity of its environment.60  
One should be careful however in drawing generalised conclusions from the 
comparison between social and biological autopoiesis.61 In scientific terms there is a 
wide gap between the autopoiesis of cells, organs and the nervous systems and that of 
the process by which society evolves, adapts and reproduces.62 Luhmann’s use of 
second-order observation and autopoiesis should be viewed as attempt to encourage 
us to integrate ideas from systems into the operation of sub-systems such as law and 
in particular their meaning construction operations. Three observations could be 
offered here. First, rather than view social problems like phishing through the juridical 
or political framework, Luhmann highlights the significance of the relationship 
between the self-referential properties of sub-systems in society and the constraints 
systems operate under. 63 The self-referential properties are for example, necessary for 
systems to retain their unity and distinctiveness. Accordingly, we can think of each 
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Second, as the diagram makes explicit, social systems have functional-problem 
solving structures and processes. These structures and processes are self-referential. 
The ability of law to provide the ‘right answers’ is consistent with the role of its 
structures and meaning construction processes.64 For example, law reconstructs the 
risks encountered in society as legal communications.65 When an identity thief has 
been apprehended and prosecuted, law can then apply its rules to the situation. Law’s 
unity and distinctiveness can be seen as a form of ‘operational closure’ - a court of 
law decides a conflict or prosecution on the basis of the established precedents and 
legal rules and not what the newspapers say should be the outcome.66 Third, law’s 
meaning construction processes acts as a constraint:67  
“If burglars believe that their chances of getting caught are very 
slim, nothing that the criminal law can do will effectively control the 
incidence of burglary. Law, as a social communication system, 
simply has no way of understanding getting caught/not getting 
caught through its lawful/unlawful coding. All that the law may do 
is to encourage burglars to own up to the times when they did not 
get caught by making it lawful for courts to take them into account 
in sentencing and in doing so rule out any future prosecution. But 
this, of course, depends upon the burglar getting caught in the first 
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place. Furthermore, there may well be other factors which could 
reduce the number of burglaries, such as improved home security, 
better police detection, more police officers, neighbourhood watch 
etc, but these are invisible to the law, which sees only what it can 
see using the restricted vision of its coding.” 
Functionally differentiated systems construct meaning from events in their own terms. 
There are limits to the ability of a system to construct meanings from events. For 
example, under the Theft Act 1968, law had no way of making sense of ‘identity’ 
theft. This constraint is now overcome by legislative intervention in the form of the 
Fraud Act 2006. It should be noted here that the emphasis shifts away from ideas of 
“gain” or “loss”, and towards the intent of the identity thief. To be sure, following the 
passing of the Fraud Act 2006 the fact that machines cannot be deceived, as in the 
case where the phisher assumes the identity of a person to gain access to a bank 
account, and deceives a machine, is not considered to be an obstacle. 
A related consideration is that law cannot impose its knowledge of risk onto other 
systems. This is a key point. Sub-systems have programmes and processes that enable 
them to retain their identity whilst being open to their environment. Perturbations 
from the environment lead to the system assessing its operations with a view to 














Knowledge about risks is not static or given but is constantly being reproduced and 
created through interactions. Notwithstanding the constraints inherent in law, sub-
systems are provided with a facility to make sense of other communications. System 
response to turbulence and disruption caused by information security threats is 
however affected by the ‘time lag’ between the ‘actual’ state and the ‘desired’ state. 
Recall that until the enactment of the Fraud Act 2006, the act of deceiving a machine 
could not be regarded as a form of meaningful communication. Until the enactment of 
the 2006 Act, law had no processes for determining the legality or illegality of 
‘deceiving machines’. Exchanges of information between sub-systems can however 
take place through the process of structural coupling.  Structural coupling enables a 
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programming enable each sub-system to make sense of its own world and process 
information into meaningful communications. Law’s inability to deter identity 
thieves, for example, may lead to the perturbations being reconstructed by other sub-
systems into meaningful communications. Signals to the economy can be seen in the 
expansion of the market for information security products and services. The market 
for information security is now worth $4.684 billion, which is an increase of 17.1 per 
cent from the previous year.68 The economy transforms the perturbations into 
economic communications via the price mechanism. Law’s inability to deter identity 
theft may lead to science producing knowledge in the form of algorithms that promote 
end-point security – these are coded as true/false and the input of system level 
software authors provide content for the various programmes. Given that identity theft 
deploys social engineering techniques, the education system will increase the 
availability of knowledge so that users can make informed decisions. 
3.1 Conclusion 
It should be noted that Luhmann’s theory provides us with one framework for 
conceptualising the governance challenges facing society. This is sometimes 
overlooked. It may explain, for example, why it is lawyers who view the criminal law 
as providing ‘right answers’ may find Luhmann’s view of autopoietic systems 
problematic.69 To better understand the role of law, we need a coherent understanding 
of complex social systems and their implications for governance. For example, it is 
often assumed in discussions on the relationship between law, technology and society 
on the one hand and governance, risk and responsibility on the other, that software 
code, law or policy prescriptions from the government will be adequate to manage 
society which is becoming increasingly differentiated and specialised. Luhmann 
reminds us that ultimately sustainable systems must either model the complexity of 
their environment (and become more complex) or conversely reduce complexity in 
the environment. Communications taking place in invariant autonomous systems 
underscore the growing interest in seeking sustainable regulatory solutions. 
Luhmann’s framing of society as meaningful communications and the effect of law’s 
coding of its environment demonstrates the problematic of risk and the futility of 
using law to conceptualise risk in a manner that accommodates the way other 
autopoietic and functionally differentiated systems construct meaning of similar 
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events.70 Luhmann directs our focus instead towards understanding the structures and 
processes by which each system transforms information in its environment into 
communications generated by the system that serve as inputs and outputs.71  As 
Leydesdorff observes:72 
“The different function systems use various codes for providing 
meaning for communication. Whereas the hierarchical (catholic) 
system had only a single centre of control - that was based on a holy 
text - economic exchange relations, for example, could now be 
handled by making payments. The symbolically generalized medium 
of money makes it no longer necessary to communicate by 
negotiating prices verbally or imposing them by force. The 
specification of a price as an expected market value speeds up the 
economic transaction processes by organizing the communication in 
a specific (that is, functionally codified) format.” 
To conclude, social systems can be viewed as bounded systems with structures and 
components that seek to reconcile the functions and goals of the individual system 
with the disturbances and conditions of the environment.73 Communication systems 
can therefore be seen as engaged in a complex process of information gathering, 
ordering and standard setting. This is a non-linear and recursive process that involves 
using not only existing information but also those which are created as a result of a 
system’s autopoietic activities. Instead of viewing governance in terms of the 
coordinating instruments provided by law, norms, market and technology, we can 
instead regard the process of self-organisation as involving complex differentiated and 
constructive processes by which risk is conceptualised. If we accept that 
communications constitute social systems, we can now assess the significance of 
viewing the problem of information insecurity in terms of reflexive risk 
communications.74  
4. Revisiting Identity Theft 
4.1 The Network of Communications 
We are said to be living in the age of the information society. Our individual and 
collective identities are being processed and defined by electronic information 
networks.75 The process of constructing the information society, the content and 
meaning we ascribe to it cannot be separated from the institutions, rules and norms 
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that govern these activities.76 New opportunities are being created for expression and 
the constitution of constituencies.77 This new medium facilitates the formation of new 
communities, social, cultural, political and economic interaction. The expansion of the 
Internet, the growth of search engines, and web pages and emergence of complex 
systems and behaviour could be viewed as displaying (semi) autopoietic patterns.78 In 
his comprehensive study of the network society, Castells draws on some basic ideas 
of systems theory in his use of the metaphor of the space of flows to describe the 
process of meaning construction and the organisational logic of networks that are not 
dependent on functional and centralised hierarchical systems of ordering and control 
as such.79 Castells does not however dissent from the view that the Internet is a 
medium populated by interdependent social actors as embodied in the:80 
“…flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows 
of organizational interaction, flows of images, sounds, and symbols. 
Flows are not just one element of the social organization: they are 
the expression of processes, dominating our economic, political, 
and symbolic life. If such is the case, the material support of the 
dominant processes in our societies will be the ensemble of elements 
supporting such flows, and making materially possible their 
articulation in simultaneous time. Thus, I propose the idea that 
there is a new spatial form characteristic of social practices that 
dominate and shape the network society: the space of flows. The 
space of flows is the material organization of time-sharing social 
practices that work through flows. By flows I understand purposeful, 
repetitive, programmable sequences of exchange and interaction 
between physically disjointed positions held by social actors in the 
economic, political, and symbolic structures of society.” 
The role of law in steering through social policies has now to accommodate the 
transformative effects of the Internet on the relational dynamics between the State and 
individuals in society on the one hand and the relationship between sub-systems on 
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the other.81 Luhmann’s conception of society as being constituted by communications, 
when transposed onto the Internet, underscores the complex tiers of information 
exchange, interaction and communication. Consider the reach of Luhmann’s analysis 
of society and the resource potential of structural coupling in this highly 
interconnected environment in this observation by Benkler:82  
“We live in a technological context in which a tremendous amount 
of excess capacity of the basic building blocks of our information 
and communication infrastructure is widely deployed. The widely 
distributed and topologically diverse deployment of these resources 
makes them ideally suited for building redundant, survivable backup 
systems for our basic information and communications 
infrastructure. Harnessing this excess capacity to create such a 
survivable infrastructure will likely be done most effectively, not 
through improving the ability to price these resources, but through 
improving the conditions for social sharing and exchange of the 
excess capacity users own. If we invest our policy efforts in 
hardening our systems to attack instead of rendering them 
survivable, if we ignore in our institutional design choices the 
effects on price-based markets and enterprise organization, we will 
lose a significant opportunity to improve the survivability of our 
information systems at relatively low cost and with minimal 
bureaucratic intervention.” 
Luhmann’s ideas of autopoesis and social systems may enable us to gain a better 
understanding of not only how the process of information sharing and exchange can 
take place but also the operable constraints that may prescribe the policy goals and 
objectives. 
4.2 Application 
A summary of some of the implications of Luhmann’s insights for debates on the 
ability of the Fraud Act 2006 to manage political expectations about order and 
security in the online environment may be appropriate at this stage. We suggest that 
Luhmann’s ideas about functionally differentiated and self-generating sub-systems 
when extended to identity theft have three specific implications for the way we can 
conceptualise and understand Internet governance. As argued previously, law is a 
necessary but not a sufficient governance instrument in managing the emerging 
threats on the Internet. The risks posed by identity theft are juridicalised – the illegal 
behaviour is identified and the outcome to such forms deviant behaviour is identified 
at the outset. The intention to derive a gain or cause a loss will now be sufficient. The 
political construction of risk is now interpreted by the courts and the institutions of 
enforcement through structural coupling. Second, phishing or identity theft is not a 
problem that law can solve – ultimately online criminal behaviour is a social not 
technologically driven problem. Notwithstanding the limits on the criminal law, 
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Luhmann provides us with a framework that goes beyond the juridicalisation of 
identity theft. The third implication, we submit, is that emerging networks for 
information sharing, the evolution of specialised technological solutions and increased 
end-user participation is indicative of an important trend in the way online threats are 




The central point here is that notwithstanding the limits faced by law in 
conceptualizing risks posed by identity theft or phishing attacks, we need to 
acknowledge the fact that other social systems and organisations can respond 
reflexively. Such a process enables society to transform itself, not in the sense of 
converting inputs into outputs, but through the autopoiesis of risk communications. In 
short, reflexive risk communications are producing functional systems and 
organisations that attempt to model complexity, security and system. Individuals, 
public and private actors can exist in different systems, organisations and can engage 
in interactions.83 It is instructive to observe the way each sub-system reconstructs risk. 
For example, science is now assuming an important role in the light of political and 
legal communications and the constraints facing these systems in managing security 
threats. The emergence of new technological solutions and production of knowledge 
can in this respect be seen as a form of science coupling with law, politics education 
and economy. The market for information security is equally vibrant with a range of 
products relating to security and commercial operating systems.84 VeriSign, for 
example, provides intrusion detection, threat scanning and patch implementation 
functions. Google, currently use web-crawlers to identify infected web pages. The 
process is akin to a form of data mining of infection vectors. Suspect URLs are visited 
and observed, with the aim of determining the malicious capabilities of these 
websites. Where a web site is shown to have malware binaries, the pages are marked 
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as potentially harmful and displayed in search results.85 Exploit Labs, for example 
provide LinkScanner functionality. Website owners can install a malicious content 
scanner on their site.86 Visitors to the site can type or paste a URL into the 
LinkScanner text box and will know whether the web page is safe. If the link has 
potential malware binaries, the visitor will be informed of this. Another illustration of 
the growing trend of sub-systems responding to the constraints of law is the increased 
assimilation by these systems of ‘ordering’ values and norms.  
Education and scientific systems are responding to the increased use of social 
engineering and malware infection techniques. These processes aim to provide a 







The use of “behaviour-based” technology helps minimise the threat consequences 
posed by the “gullible” human. For example, science reconstructs the decision making 
process that leads to risk exposure and puts in place the type of technology that 
independently undertakes an inspection of the application-level traffic and analyses 
the behaviour of suspect codes.87 Organisations and individuals can now purchase 
secure gateway products to provide them with real time protection. 
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Additionally, software products now enable the identity of websites to be 
authenticated.88 This software enables end users to determine whether the website 
they are visiting or accessed via an email link is a trusted site. The process of 
authentication is fairly straightforward. The user needs only to place the mouse over a 
logo or image and the verification software will highlight the trust credentials of the 
site. Given that the setting up of unique phishing websites is on the increase, this 
software aims to promote trust and confidence in end user being exploited by ‘drive-
by malware’. BankSafe is another commercial provider who has encoded ‘risk 
management’ norms into its anti-phishing software.89 This software runs on Windows 
applications and provides real time protection. It scans web pages visited by the end 
user. For example, when the user visits a malware vector that steals passwords and 
usernames, the browser is instantly shut down. The software also provides an early 
warning detection facility when phishing emails arrive into the inbox or fake DNS 
entries detected. 
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The scientific communications are not only to be limited to commercial security 
software providers and standard setting organisations but also extend to spheres when 
individuals and organisations in society engage in communications about installing 
appropriate software and adopting Internet safety measures. ISPs for example, now 
educate subscribers and users on the importance of safe browsing. This initiative is an 
important response to malware writers increasingly targeting instant messaging and 
peer-to-peer networks as potential vectors for distribution of viruses and worms. 
Equally, commercial and non-commercial organisations now make available “safety 
packages” as part of their subscription, with regular information about security issues 
and updates for browsers, plugins, applications and operating systems.90 For example, 
the Mozilla Foundation now makes phishing protection available on a non-
commercial basis.91 Visitors to the site are provided with a test site to see if the 
phishing protection facility on their system has been enabled. Microsoft also provides 
a range of information seeking to educate users on the type of phishing hoaxes.92 
These developments are in Luhmann’s sense normatively closed autopoietic 
selections. These selections can be viewed as processes by which science and 
education synthesise information, utterance and comprehension. For the education 
system, knowledge about the threat landscape and risks are essential elements for 
decision making in organisations and individuals.  
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More generally, we cannot underestimate the valuable role played by non-State actors 
in using standards as a regulatory strategy. For example, the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) has been at the forefront of promoting transparency 
in the standardization process.93 The European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI) is another independent, non-profit organization, which continues to 
contribute to the creation of a culture of information security by developing 
telecommunications standards for technologies, which include telecommunications, 
broadcasting, intelligent transportation and medical electronics. The European 
Network and Information Security Agency, is another agency, which has directed its 
efforts in preventing, addressing and responding to information security issues.94 
Following the second phase of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 
in Tunis in 2005, the ITU acts as moderator of the WSIS Action Line C5 on building 
trust and security in the use of information and communication technologies.95 The 
early indications are that these processes for information exchange and dissemination 
are providing avenues for structural coupling and sharing of knowledge and 
expertise.96 Finally, the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe now 
makes available a binding international instrument on this particular subject.97 This 
Convention provides a guideline, which countries can use to develop national 
legislation against Cybercrime and as a framework for international cooperation.98 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has sought to demonstrate that the Fraud Act 2006 facilitates the 
prosecution of identity theft and therefore makes a valuable contribution to Internet 
governance. That said, an overemphasis on the role of law can lead us to overlook the 
fact that the idea of absolute online security is a myth. Law may have some of the 
‘right answers’. Luhmann’s ideas about functionally differentiated and autopoietic 
systems however, remind us that a deeper understanding of the reality of the threat 
landscape is a critical pre-requisite to information security policymaking. What is true 
of the processes and structures through which law conceptualises risk in the threat 
landscape is also true of other autopoietic sub-systems. Each sub-system 
conceptualises risk not with some universal or utopian goal but rather, with self-
preservation in mind. Three observations may be offered by way of a conclusion. 
First, viewing society as a complex aggregate of systems that exhibit characteristics of 
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operational closure and open cognitive processes is timely – decentralised and 
distributed networks require an expansive view of governance. Second, as individuals 
can now belong to different subsystems (organisations) it becomes imperative that we 
seek creative ways through which online security spaces can be maintained. Third, we 
need to re-think how best questions about risk, responsibility and accountability can 
be structurally coupled with each other in a highly complex environment. 
 
